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1. Two KINDS OF INTERLOCUTORS
I would like first to distinguish carefully between interlocutors I call
"reasonable"-whether or not they defend the right of girls in high
school to wear the veil-and advocates of views I consider
"unreasonable." Of course, the very notion of reasonableness depends
on certain basic shared values. In the present case, these values are
liberal-democratic, that is, human rights and popular sovereignty. If one
chooses to defend a given position from inside the realm of these values,
one must necessarily begin the process of argumentation by proposing
some premises that will be generally accepted by the relevant audience,
that is, individuals who, from a moral point of view, value the principles
of liberal democracy and whatever consequences they might entail.
In such a context, there are two categories of people who, in my
opinion, are "for" or "against" the veil at school for unreasonable
motives, that is, justifications that are incompatible with the values of
human rights and democracy. The first category of people are racists
* Free University of Brussels (ULB).
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who hate-among other stigmatized groups-Muslims and for that
reason want to reject whatever seems to be related to values cherished by
people they definitely do not want to live with. So they are "against" the
veil because they want to preserve, say, the "white" nature of the West.
Of course, they very rarely speak in such a blunt way in the public
sphere, as, in order to be listened to, one must at least pay lip service to
the values of an audience dedicated to defending the basic equality of
human beings, and thus to reject any form of racism. There are hidden
forms of racial prejudice, and we shall see that it is often very difficult in
these cases to detect, behind the respectable "surface" of supposedly
liberal-democratic arguments, the core of a racist position. In countries
where racist speech is criminalized-as is the case of many European
States-a judge's task is made still more difficult because of such a
process of "disguising" racist assumptions. Still, the racist does not
defend a position that can be considered acceptable in the realm of
Rawlsian "reasonable pluralism" which characterizes political
liberalism.' In the argumentative process about the veil, interlocutors
who want to rapidly get rid of their opponents often, unfortunately, will
try to confuse a racist rejection of Muslims with a reasonable position.
To weaken an opponent, one can-very unfairly indeed-try to give him
a very bad reputation, while forgetting that it is not because two currents
of thought defend the same thesis on a particular point that they can be
confused or even identified to each other. In short, there are democrats
and racists against the veil. I try here to discuss the question with the
former, not the latter, although we shall see that the distinction is more
complicated than it appears at first glance.
Conversely, Islamic fundamentalists defend the veil for
unacceptable reasons. They give justifications that are at odds with
liberal-democratic values. They want to "colonize" the democratic
public sphere. In short, they despise democracy and human rights and
simply want to seize any opportunity to promote their undemocratic
conceptions. I can make a similar argument about these Islamist
proponents: they should not be confused with liberal-democratic
advocates of the veil at school. And there is always the tendency of
confusing the latter with the former in order to radically weaken the
"reasonable" position taken by an opponent.
I do not want to argue here with racists or Islamists who are
"against" or "in favor of' the veil for the wrong reasons. My aim is to
confront the respective positions of advocates and opponents of hijab at
1. The notion of "reasonableness" I defend here is very close to Rawls's concept of
"reasonable pluralism." See JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36-37 (Columbia Univ.
Press 1993).
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school who seriously and sincerely defend liberal-democratic values.2
Such a controversy is perfectly normal in the framework of deliberative
democracy, where various interpretations of the basic values of the polis
are tested against each other in the public sphere.
What distinguishes democrats from racists and fundamentalists
consists in that the former-be they for or against the wearing of the veil
at school-share some ideals concerning the school's missions in terms
of transmitting values. Even if, between the Left and the Right or
between religious and non-religious people, some nuances can appear in
such a context, generally speaking the nuances affirm that science
courses must be given without any interference, notably for religious
reasons; they want their children to be taught a strict respect of equality
between women and men, as well as between heterosexuals and
homosexuals; they think that the history of World War II-and notably
the Holocaust-should be explained without any pressure or
intimidation, because it forms the very basis of our democracies ("never
that again!"); and they defend coeducation and the right of individuals of
both genders to meet, work together and love each other without any
intrusion by families and society in general into their privacy or their
most personal choices.
On the other hand, what divides democrats, racists and
fundamentalists in the present context is the following: some argue that
these values can be taught and defended-which is vital indeed for the
future of our children-while accepting the veil at school, whereas others
consider this not to be possible. I agree with the latter for the following
reasons.
2. THE HIJAB CONTROVERSY AND "LAICITt"ACCORDING TO THE
FRENCH CONSEIL D'ETAT
The hijab controversy first began in France in 1989. No provisions
in the 1905 Law of Separation of Churches and State, the 1958
Constitution, or the body of administrative law dealt with the veil.3 The
phenomenon was new; at least it was new in French schools. There has
always been, in countries where Islam is the religion of the majority, a
2. I shall use the word "hijab" to refer to the "simple" scarf covering the head of
the woman, as opposed to, for instance, the burqa, which covers the whole body and face.
The debate about wearing veils at school only concerns the hijab. There is a wide
consensus that the burqa should not be allowed. The French are even contemplating
legislation on the subject in order to prohibit the burqa in all public places. See French
Burka Ban a Step Closer, RFI, May 12, 2010, http://www.english.rfi.fr/france/20100512-
french-burka-ban-step-closer.
3. Loi du dicembre 1905 concernant sde 9paration des Eglises et de l'Etat
(adopted Dec. 9, 1905), http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte =
LEGITEXT000006070169&dateTexte=20100126 (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
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"traditional" veil that has taken very different forms according to time
and place. But in big cities, particularly in Iran, under the rule of the
Shah, modem and emancipated women did not wear the veil. Then in
1979, Khomeini came to power in Tehran, and one could see on
television what occurred to women who wanted to keep living without
the veil (which is called chador in Iran). The Guardians of Revolution
forced these women to wear the veil, and in a very violent way indeed.
But after all, such an action was at least intellectually clear: an official
religion requires that a State be used as a "secular arm" to impose the
Truth and the Good on individuals who are neither ready nor able to
discover and follow the divine Path by themselves. What these events
meant was in a sense confused by the fact that the Iranian Shiite
revolution could be interpreted, concerning some of its aspects, in a
Leftist way. The Shah had been a staunch ally of the United States, and
the 1979 revolution promoted-at least in the eyes of naive intellectuals
such as Michel Foucault-some popular and social objectives that
generated admiration from some members of "the Left."4 These people
were heavily criticized by those who had not already forgotten the
na'vet6 of the intellectuals who had defended Communism for its
supposedly social progressivism, and had played down (or had not
wanted to see) the despotic character of that political movement.
Opponents of the "blindness" of intellectuals emphasized the fact that,
again, a supposedly progressive movement had fallen prey to a very
illiberal tendency. Imposing the veil was the most blatant symptom of
the ascent of official religion in the Muslim world.
Actually, Iran is the only Muslim country where what was called by
French sociologist Gilles Kepel "reislamization from the bottom"
succeeded.5  In all Arab countries, the movement failed, and the
repression that ensued was particularly brutal. But Iranians were able to
topple a pro-United States government and establish a religion by very
violent means. Ten years later, in 1989, in France, a few girls came to a
public school in Creil, in the vicinity of Paris, each wearing a hijab. The
director of the school decided to ask the girls to take the hijabs off.
When the girls refused to do that, the school director expelled them from
school; a controversy immediately ensued. The then Socialist Minister
of National Education, Lionel Jospin, was embarrassed because the Left
and Right were deeply divided about the subject. One might be surprised
4. He traveled to Iran in 1979, just before Khomeini seized power, and he found
that the revolutionaries showed a form of "new spirituality." Later, he deeply regretted
his na'vet.
5. See GILLES KEPEL, LA REVANCHE DE DiEu CHRPTIENS, JUIFS ET MUSULMANS A LA
RECONQUI TE DU MONDE 56-81 (Editions du Seuil 1991), quoted by GUY HAARSCHER, LES
DtMOCRATIES SURVIVRONT-ELLES AU TERRORISME 62 (J.M. Dubray, 3d ed. 2008).
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to learn that there was a controversy about the veil, or, more precisely,
that wearing the veil could be defended in the name of liberal-democratic
principles. Indeed, as we have seen, the Iranian revolution had shown
that an opposition existed between democratic liberty (women in Tehran
and other big Iranian cities did not want to wear the chador) and official
religion (the Pasdaran6 forced them to do so). In France in 1989, the
controversy was supposed to take place inside the domain of democratic
debate, so that a change of meaning had necessarily occurred. In other
terms, how was it then possible for a part of the democratic polity to
defend the veil? The answer was that in Creil the girls themselves
wanted to come to school with their Islamic scarves. They interpreted
the scarves not in terms of religious imposition, but in terms of religious
liberty. The basic assumption was that, as an act of liberty, the wearing
of the veil should be permitted (tolerated) and even protected as a right.
But the other half, so to say, of the polity considered the veil to
amount to an intrusion of fundamentalist religion into the domain of the
"State" (the public school). These French citizens had not forgotten Iran,
and they knew that a command could be internalized by the girls when
they were exposed to more or less informal pressures. So Jospin asked
the highest administrative council-the Conseil d'Etat-to deliver an
advisory opinion about the compatibility of the claim (wearing the veil in
public school) with the secularism (lai'citi) of the State that the 1958
French Constitution guaranteed.7 The answer the judges gave at the end
of 1989 might sound surprising to many Americans, who often think that
French secularism is biased against religion. Indeed, the Conseil d'Etat
declared that as such, the wearing of the veil was not against lai'cit , and
was an exercise of freedom of religion. The administrative court added
that if supplementary elements were present, the school directors would
be entitled to take some measures including a possible veil ban. What
were these "supplementary elements"? The Conseil d'Etat mentioned
pressures on girls to force them to wear the veil-pressures that included
provocation, proselytizing, propaganda, acts against the dignity or the
freedom of the pupil, and breach of school order.8 In short, the Council
considered that the shared values underpinning the education system's
missions had to be preserved. Were that not possible when the veil was
6. That is, the Guardians of Revolution.
7. 1958 CONST. art. 1, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bankimm/anglais/constiution-anglais-oct2009.pdf (last visited Mar.
23, 2010) ("France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic.").
8. Conseil d'Etat, Section de l'Int~rieur, 27 novembre 1989, n* 346893, Avis "Port
de foulard islamique," [Advisory Opinion Concerning the Wearing of the Islamic Scarf],
available at http://www.rajf.org/spip.php?articlel 065 (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
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accepted, then-but only then-could school authorities legally forbid
the veil.
After the advisory opinion was delivered, school directors had to
accept the girls who "only" wore the veil if the abovementioned
supplementary elements were not present. So they were not authorized
to take general a priori measures of prohibition. Such a position is
certainly appealing to American constitutional-law specialists. Basically,
it corresponds to the idea that freedom of religion is a fundamental right
that should not be curtailed except when a certain kind of behavior
endangers the respect of some essential values. Indeed, the State has a
compelling interest in protecting the latter. In the United States, such
protection is granted to political symbolic speech at school. In a famous
case concerning armbands worn by students who wanted to protest
against the Vietnam War, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded, after
arguing very similarly to the French Conseil d'Etat, that if the students
did not disrupt the organization of the courses, they had the right to wear
the armbands.9 More generally speaking, liberty must be the rule and
limitations the exception, which runs counter to the idea of an a priori
prohibition. The U.S. Supreme Court would certainly consider such a
prohibition to be overbroad, as it would also limit the liberty of good
students who "only" wore the veil (or an armband) and behaved as any
other "normal" pupil would.
In Belgium, the same kind of events took place in 1989 and after,
but the legal reaction was substantially different. Belgian public-school
directors were authorized to decide themselves whether they would allow
the veil to be worn in school. Some schools adopted pedagogical
projects according to which the wearing of the veil could promote
9. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503, 514 (1969);
As we have discussed, the record does not demonstrate any facts which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on
the school premises in fact occurred. These petitioners merely went about their
ordained rounds in school. Their deviation consisted only in wearing on their
sleeve a band of black cloth, not more than two inches wide. They wore it to
exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnam hostilities and their advocacy of a
truce, to make their views known, and, by their example, to influence others to
adopt them. They neither interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude in
the school affairs or the lives of others.
Id. Of course, this is a matter of political (symbolic) speech. But it seems to me that,
particularly in the United States, if political speech is permitted, religious speech will a
fortiori not be prohibited. It was for a long time-and in a sense it still is-more difficult
to argue in the United States, as religious opinions have been considered more valuable-
and thus in a better position to be protected-than "simple" political opinions, at least in
the domain of conscientious objection. See generally U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965); Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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integration: girls would not be "stigmatized," and such a policy was
expected to pacify inter-ethnic relations. Directors of these "pro-veil"
schools were quite aware that some supplementary elements (in the sense
given to the phrase by the French Conseil d'Etat) might be present: in
these circumstances, particularly when extremists were very active, there
was an intrinsic link between the veil and the kind of behavior every
democrat agreed should be avoided. But in France, the basic idea was
that such a link between the hijab (permitted) and a disrespect of the
abovementioned values related to the missions of the public school
system (forbidden) could not be a priori presupposed. In Belgium, the
school boards were authorized to prohibit the veil if they believed their
pedagogical project would be better served by a general ban on
ostentatious religious and political signs.
Since 1989, different strategies have been adopted in France and
Belgium regarding the veil. In France, schools had to accept girls
wearing the Islamic scarf unless "supplementary elements" were present.
In Belgium, school boards did whatever they pleased. They had-and
still have--discretionary power to accept or refuse the veil.
3. THE 2004 FRENCH LAW: REASONABLE OR UNREASONABLE?
Approximately fifteen years later, the vast majority of French
directors and teachers, and more generally the members of the public
education system, considered the situation to be simply unmanageable.
They argued that wearing the veil was almost always related to a context
of pressures, violence, and deterioration of the status of women. Of
course, they recognized that a girl could wear the veil for various
personal reasons. It is difficult and quite intrusive to sound out the hearts
and fathom the intentions. But the "supplementary elements" seemed to
be clearly present when the girls wanted to wear the scarf in class. And
even if some girls wore the veil and respected all the rules of the school,
distinguishing between the "good" veil and the "bad" veil (the
colonization of the public space by more or less disguised
fundamentalists) led to unacceptably intrusive practices. For most
teachers and school administrators, case-by-case decisions had become
unmanageable. At the same time, the movement in favor of the veil had
become increasingly radical, which meant that it was decreasingly
possible to separate the "supplementary elements" from the simple
dressing habit.
Outside the educational system, opinions were much more balanced.
But the teachers and directors could argue that they had to deal with the
problem on a daily basis, that they "knew" the intractable difficulties
generated by the veil, and that the rest of France had only an abstract
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
view of the question. So when, in 2003, the school authorities asked the
Parliament to take its responsibilities, French President Jacques Chirac
wisely decided to create a commission of experts that could deal
objectively with the situation and write an informed report. Bernard
Stasi, a highly respected French Centrist politician, headed the
commission. Among the members were "pro-veil" academics. Other
commission members favored a general measure of prohibition. The
commission met during several months. In the end, all members favored
a law prohibiting the veil in public school (there was only one abstention,
and no negative vote). Several members of the Stasi commission had
changed their mind because the meetings and hearings had shown them
the paramount presence of what I called above the "supplementary
elements." In March 2004, the statute prohibiting ostensible religious
signs at school was passed.' 0
In Belgium, the solution was not the same as in France: the school
boards had discretionary power to permit or forbid the hijab. But
reactions after fifteen years of experience were similar: teachers and
directors were confronted with a growing presence of Islamic
fundamentalism. But they did not have to ask the legislator to prohibit
the veil: they just had to use their discretionary power. In 2010, 95
percent of Belgian schools-Flemish as well as French-speaking-
prohibit the veil. The schools that have in good faith tried to implement
a liberal "veil policy" have been obliged to abandon it. Recently in the
same country, the Flemish Council of Education took a general measure
of prohibition."
In France and Belgium, teachers and directors reacted the same way
in different legal environments. The policy consisting of separating the
"simple" wearing of the veil from attacks on the above-mentioned values
had been imposed by the French Conseil d'Etat in 1989, and
experimented with by a substantial number of schools in Belgium.
Under the pressure of the school "actors," the French Parliament had
legislated, and the vast majority of Belgian schools had finally decided,
to prohibit the Islamic scarf. One should respect the choice made by
educators, who are responsible for our children and are often mistreated
and notoriously underpaid. So today the question is: are the advocates of
10. See Commission de r6flexion ur l'application du principe de la'icit6 ans la
R6publique, Rapport au President de la R6publique, Dec. 23, 2003, http://lesrapports.
ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/034000725/0000.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
See also Loi n 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de
laicit6, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les
6coles, coll~ges et lycres publics, http://www.senat.fr/apleg/pjl03-209.html (last visited
Jan. 26, 2010).
11. See Belga, Anvers: 9cole sans voile, LE Sor, Sept. 12, 2009.
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legislation in Belgium that would contain provisions similar to the ones
included in the advisory opinion of the French highest administrative
jurisdiction in 1989 ready to disregard fifteen years of basically negative
experience? Many commentators simply think that history has definitely
shown that such a solution is unmanageable.
That position is debatable, and, as I noted at the beginning of this
article, there is always the possibility of a reasonable disagreement
between democratically minded citizens concerning the veil at school.
One must observe that such a possible disagreement necessarily entails
that any solution must be pragmatic and open to reasonable compromises
or "accommodations." My point so far has consisted of showing that for
public schools, there are many lessons to be learned from grass-roots
experience. This experience suggests that allowing the veil in secondary
school is not practicable. Such a policy amounts to an unreasonable
accommodation. Of course, in a free society, there are many kinds of
behavior, and, a fortiori, of speech, that we dislike but should
nevertheless be ready to tolerate. A well-known theory providing a
criterion for establishing the limit between what should be permitted and
what should be prohibited is based on the distinction between conduct
and speech (including symbolic speech-which the wearing of the veil
obviously is). The latter distinction was used by the French Conseil
d'Etat when, in 1989, it followed the so-called "American way." But
American constitutional law also allows for a legitimate prohibition of
speech when it is essentially entangled with conduct. When the
separation between speech and conduct is deemed impossible on the
basis of a considered judgment, speech may be legitimately limited.12
The fact that we are here in a context of real vulnerability (the concerned
girls are for the most part not adult) only adds to the strength of the
argument.
Unfortunately, very often, participants in the veil controversy do not
respect the distinctions I drew in the beginning of the article. Indeed, it
is very easy-and thus quite tempting-to (sometimes deliberately)
confuse the position of an opponent with the theses defended by other
adversaries who base their reasoning on undemocratic premises. By the
way, this is the reason why notions like "genocide" are so often used in
heated controversies: it ordinarily pays off to paint the other in black in
order to a priori disqualify whatever arguments he might use in the
course of the debate. Such a strategy was once called by French
12. See R. L. WEAVER & D. E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 108
(LexisNexis 2003) ("[W]hen speech and non-speech elements coalesce, incidental
restrictions on First Amendment freedoms can be justified by an important enough
interest in regulating the non-speech factor."); U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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sociologist Ren6 Girard the "poisoning of the source." It consists of
transferring the weight of the argument from the statement to the subject
of enunciation: if "he" says so, it is not even necessary to enter into an
analysis of the content of his discourse, because his moral character has
been a priori questioned. So again: there are-to simplify the situation
for pedagogic purposes--democrats and racists who advocate a
prohibition of the veil at school, as there are democrats and
fundamentalists who take the opposite position. In order not to have to
listen to the arguments put forward by the "other" (and thus not to be
obliged to rebut them), the best cynical strategy consists of deliberately
confusing the respectable interlocutor with the "bad guy."
To summarize the position I defend here, I shall say that it is
deliberately pragmatic and nuanced. As I said in the beginning, I wanted
first to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable interlocutors,
knowing that of course everybody can have the temptation to confuse the
reasonable interlocutor with the unreasonable one: such a rhetorical trick
helps paint the opponent in black, making his "defeat" easier.
Reasonable interlocutors are deeply committed to defending liberal
democratic values. Nevertheless, they adopt opposed positions
concerning the wearing of the hijab at school. So I began with the core
values that the reasonable interlocutors are ready to defend. Of course
some of these values can be interpreted in different ways, which is
perfectly normal in democracy. Such variations exist between the Right
and the Left, or between the religious and the secularist (they have
different conceptions of the neutrality of the State in spiritual mattersl 3).
They might have implications concerning abortion, gay marriage,
euthanasia, etc. So liberal-democratic values may be defended in
different ways, but in any case they are opposed to racism and
fundamentalism. The racist and the fundamentalist have their own
reasons to respectively oppose or defend the veil at school: the first
hates Muslims, the second hates secularism, the West and "unbelievers."
4. THE "WOLF IN THE SHEEPFOLD"
Now, very often, extremists adopt a strategy that is not frontal. I
have called elsewhere the latter "the wolf in the sheepfold" 14: they claim
13. In the United States, there are different interpretations of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, for instance Jeffersonian wall of separation versus non-
preferentialism, etc. For a criticism of Justice Black's use of the wall metaphor, see
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). For non-preferentialism, see, e.g., the arguments
of Chief Justice Burger in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
14. For a more elaborate analysis of this concept, see Guy Haarscher, Rhetoric and
its abuses: how to oppose liberal democracy while speaking its language, in RECALLING
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that their premises are compatible with the principles of liberal
democracy-at least they pay lip service to them. Then they draw some
consequences from these premises. We are here in the realm of sophistry
(deliberate distorsion of the argumentative process in order to mislead
the audience). In short, the speaker is in bad faith-he does not sincerely
adhere to the values of human rights and democracy, and he simply uses
premises that are accepted by the audience he wants to persuade in order
to attain his aim in a more efficient way. Under such conditions, an
illiberal position may look democratic-all the more when the audience
is not well informed and does not reason correctly. Medieval philosophy
made a distinction between a sophism and a paralogism: the first one
consists of a deliberate error of reasoning (in order to confuse the
audience), the latter amounts to an involuntary error that is often
generated by "smart" sophists. Generally speaking, a sophism is made
by an orator, while a paralogism is made by an "innocent" audience.
Such a strategy can create the illusion that there are reasonable
interlocutors everywhere and that all participants in the debate are liberal
democrats. This problem is very serious because, as I said before, even
reasonable interlocutors often disagree about interpretations of the core
values they share. So fundamentalists or racists "wolves" disguising
themselves in "sheep" might present their positions as reflecting another
"normal" disagreement between reasonable interlocutors in democratic
deliberation. For instance, individuals who have not abandoned the idea
that the State should protect an "official" religion will promote freedom
of religion, not in order to sincerely defend human rights, but in order to
reconquer positions lost by churches and confessions in a secularized
world. The Muslim intellectual Tariq Ramadan used such a strategy
when the play Mahomet by Voltaire was not shown in Geneva during the
ceremonies related to the three hundredth birthday of the author, because
there were too many pressures and threats coming from religious
activists.' 5 Ramadan denied that this amounted to censorship (or the
most perverse form of the latter: selflcensorship) and declared that it was
a matter of "delicacy": he wanted the "sensitivities" of Muslims to be
respected. Almost everybody in constitutional democracies is against
censorship, which has acquired a very bad reputation-but who would
Vico's LAMENT: THE ROLE OF PRUDENCE IN LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION (J. Mootz III,
Jr., ed.), 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1225, 1225-59 (2008).
15. A public reading of the play was programmed in 1994 in Geneva for the 300th
anniversary of Voltaire's birthday. It was cancelled, notably under the pressure of Tariq
Ramadan. Twelve years later, on December 8 and 10, 2005, the reading could finally
take place. In 2006, Le Monde published an article stressing Ramadan's role in the 1994
events. See Herve Loichemol, Une fatwa contre Voltaire?, LE MONDE, Feb. 15, 2006.
The Muslim intellectual tried to justify himself in the same newspaper (Feb. 24, 2006).
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declare himself against "delicacy" and against the respect of religious (or
other) sensitivities? So the result remains the same: the unpopular
"speech" is suppressed, but the reason given is no more "extremist"
(religious bigotry). "Delicacy" has made disappear-it has "vaporized,"
as George Orwell would have said' 6-the very act of censorship.
"Delicacy" involves a horizontal egalitarian relationship of respect,
whereas censorship entails a vertical relationship between a dominant
protected religion and an individual exercizing his right to free speech.
Of course the argument is intrinsically sophistic in that nobody is obliged
to see a play or a movie, or to read a book-the sensitivities of
individuals who simply do not want to be confronted with the "shocking"
speech (the latter notion being taken sensu lato) are preserved, as these
people just have to abstain from looking at the work of art.
A similar rhetorical strategy is used by the extreme right. Very
often today, instead of speaking of biological "races," the racists speak in
terms of "cultures." The difference between both approaches is
important, as the term "culture" is quite legitimate in democratic
societies: actually, many people-in particular when they belong to
vulnerable minorities in danger of oppression or assimilation-defend
their right to live according to the standards and traditions of what they
call their "culture." A "race" is a different thing: a stigma that is
imposed on people against their will by other people who-to say the
least-do not want to live with them and to grant them equal rights. So
when the racist declares that immigrants belong to another "culture," he
does not say anything that, prima facie, could be considered to be at odds
with the basic tenets of constitutional democracies. He sometimes even
goes farther in the process of accomodating his discourse to the values of
human rights: he affirms that cultures are equal, which again seems
perfectly acceptable, as equality belongs to the core values of democracy.
A multiplicity of cultures is compatible with the universalism of human
rights, while of course racism strictly speaking fragments humanity into
different hierarchized biological categories. But he adds a third element:
cultures must be separated and should develop on different territories in
order not to be corrupted. The mingling of cultures would, the argument
goes, unavoidably lead either to conflicts (because the respective values
are incompatible with each other) or to a cosmopolitan subculture, a
"Macworld," and the result would be deleterious for all. The new
16. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Penguin Books 2000) (1949),
reprinted in Newspeak Appendix ("Unperson: A person who had been vaporized, and all
records of him/her had been wiped out. All other party members must forget that the
unperson ever existed, and mentioning his/her name is thought crime.").
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"racist" mentions crime, security, irreconcilable habits, etc.-all
legitimate categories in a democratic debate. '
7
Now one must consider the rhetorical change that is taking place
when such a new language is adopted. Instead of speaking of
hierarchized, unequal "races," the new racist-the wolf in sheep
clothes-speaks of equal cultures. He simply adds that, in order to be
preserved, these cultures must not be hastily mingled, which would be at
the disadvantage of all. The latter argument is actually very weak, but it
helps the racist arrive at the same results by using a rhetorical strategy
that makes him look like a reasonable interlocutor defending a "normal"
democratic opinion. That is, he argues in favor of getting rid of the
immigrants-not accepting new ones and driving the others home (at
least in the most radical version of that form of "palatable" and disguised
racism). One clearly sees the parallel between such an argumentative
process and the rhetoric used by Ramadan: the latter speaks of delicacy
instead of censorship in order to get to the same result, that is,
suppression of the shocking speech. The new racist speaks of cultures
and equality to advocate rejection of immigrants. George Orwell'
Nineteen Eighty-Four can be mentioned again: the language of liberty
serves oppression, the Minister of Propaganda is called the Minister of
Truth, etc. The wolf is so to say in the sheepfold. The opponent of
liberal democracy has become politically correct. He does not any more
use a shocking language which is frontally at odds with the tenets of
liberal democracy.
I think that these examples clearly show that the difference between
unreasonable and reasonable interlocutors could be at least partially
hidden, and thus difficult to clarify in concrete circumstances. People
may argue in favor of the wearing of the veil at school because they think
that such a policy will best promote their own (debatable but legitimate)
conception of liberal democracy, but they may also defend it because
they despise secularism and want religion to reconquer the State. If they
only invoke freedom of religion or tolerance of the "other" to make their
point, the difference between them and reasonable interlocutors will not
be visible any longer. And, of course, the same process may take place
in the other way around: a contemporary racist will say that he is against
the veil because he wants, just as the reasonable interlocutor does, to
struggle against fundamentalism-even if what he really aims at is the
rejection of an "other" he considers inferior.
We must thus be able to make a difference-I confess that it is a
very difficult task indeed-between two kinds of interlocutors that
apparently hold the same positions. The distinction I made in the
17. See PIERRE ANDRt TAGUIEFF, SUR LA NOUVELLE DROITE (Galile) (1994).
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beginning of this article between reasonable and unreasonable
interlocutors seems essential to me, but the reasonable language used by
the unreasonable individual creates a deleterious confusion in the
democratic debate. You rarely find in the current political discussions
people who clearly defend Nazism or the radical rhetoric of Al-Qaeda.
When everybody pays lip service to democratic values, the task of the
philosopher, which consists in-according to Chaim Peremean-the
systematic study of confused notions, 8 becomes all the more complex
and problematic.
5. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, ORWELL AND THE HARM
PRINCIPLE
Concerning the veil controversy, I only discussed the positions
taken by reasonable interlocutors. And of course, the arguments I gave
in favor of a general prohibition of the hijab at school allow for a
reasonable disagreement with other individuals being equally committed
to democratic values. I did not take into account bogus advocates of the
latter values: I only dealt with normal disagreements 9 stemming notably
from different sensitivities and intuitions concerning the role of religion
in a modem democratic State. My main argument consisted of saying
that the French and the Belgians had first tried to make the wearing of
the veil at school compatible with core democratic values, and that they
did not succeed. I do not pretend that such a policy is absolutely
untenable in all contexts. Indeed, the examples of Britain and the
Netherlands (or the Scandinavian countries)-to remain in the European
context-have often been used to try to show that a multiculturalist
policy granting a great deal of autonomy to religious groups was
possible. I think that the French example is not easily universalizable
and that it would be a little demagogic to exploit the 2004 assassination
of Theo Van Gogh in Holland and the 2005 bombings in London to
absolutely reject such attempts at dealing with cultural diversity. But it
remains that the French experience-and particularly the 2004 law-is
not reducible to racism or even to a "softer" assimilationist bigotry.
18. Chaim Perelman, De lajustice, in ETMQUE ET DROIT (Editions de l'Universit6 de
Bruxelles 1990) ("One can draw the conclusion, which might seem disrespectful, that the
proper object of philosophy is the systematic study of confused notions.").
19. I repeat that such disagreements are inevitable in democracy: they depend on the
diversity of positions concerning liberty, equality, economic efficiency, private morality,
ecology, etc.
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Actually, there is a fundamental ambiguity of the now trendy notion
of "reasonable accommodation. 2 ° The veil controversy can easily be
interpreted by using the latter concept: if there are no "supplementary
elements" as defined above, the accommodation of religion in the public
school can be considered reasonable, that is: the inconveniences
generated by such a benign "intrusion" of religion in the secular public
neutral sphere are sufficiently counterbalanced by the expected benefits
in terms of freedom of religion and tolerance of the other. But if the
''supplementary elements" are almost always present because the
advocates of the veil are "wolves in the sheepfold," that is, unreasonable
interlocutors hiding themselves behind an appearance of reasonableness,
then the accommodation will be considered a first step in the
(re)conquest of the secular public sphere. Instead of being
"reasonable"-in the sense I gave to the term in the beginning of this
article-accommodation will have deleterious consequences for the very
fabric of liberal democracy. In other terms, reasonable accommodation
does only make sense if one reasons as follows: democratic values come
first, and there is-to use a Rawlsian terminology2 -a priority rule that
makes them prevail. Then it will be possible (reasonable) to violate in a
benign way the accepted principles (by tolerating a visible religious
commitment in the domain of the "State") in order to accommodate the
Other. But if the wearing of the veil involves in the majority of the cases
the "supplementary elements" the French Conseil d'Etat mentioned,
accommodation will be considered unreasonable. The "slippery slope"
argument will be legitimately used in such a context: you begin with
something benign, then you are inescapably drawn to the bottom of the
slope-that is, you are committed to accepting much more than you were
ready to do in the beginning. It seems to me that the Swedish example I
gave before shows that accommodation cannot be considered reasonable
without due reflection.
The arguments ordinarily given pro and contra the veil at school are
numerous, and often mind-boggling and confusing. I hope that if one
looks at them from the perspective I have defined, a certain philosophical
clarity about the controversy can emerge. I only considered the situation
in secondary school, that is, in cases when girls are already pubescent,
but not yet adult: they are still vulnerable. The "harm principle"
advocated by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty22 requires that if an
20. See Charles Taylor and Gerard Bouchard, et al, Canadian Report on
Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences, Mar. 31, 2008,
http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/index-en.html.
21. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 40 (Harvard University Press 1971).
22. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 61 (Penguin Classics 1985) (1859) ("The object
of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the
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individual does no harm to the others, the State has no right to intervene
and force him to do something, or prevent him from doing it. Acting for
the good of the individual against his will would amount to paternalism.
So in the case of adult girls-for instance at the university-a general
measure of prohibition would not be acceptable in the framework of
liberal values. But as far as non-adults are concerned, Mill recognizes
the legitimacy of a certain amount of paternalism: it is accepted that
parents and teachers "know better" than the child or the teenager what is
good or bad for him. But I have not used such an argument here
because-even concerning the young girls-it seems a little too illiberal
to me. I was ready in the beginning to accept as a matter of principle the
position of the French Conseil d'Etat (or the very similar conception of
the United States Supreme Court in the armbands case). The only reason
why I abandoned that position was that one of its basic premises seemed
to be definitely flawed: the supplementary elements were not, in the
huge majority of the cases, separable from the "simple" wearing of the
hq'ab. This is the reason why I think that the 2004 French law can be
interpreted in reasonable terms, and that the conventional wisdom
accusing the French of a kind of innate inability to accommodate the
other is at least partially unfair. Of course, elements of nationalist
bigotry-French assimilationist chauvinism-are certainly present in a
certain part of the population and in the political parties. And there are
advocates of dogmatic secularism, that is, an ideological antireligious
form of "lai'cit." But again, the latter cannot fairly and without
prejudice be hastily identified with the reasonable position that was taken
by the very respectable members of the Stasi commission. It remains
that, in a more favorable context, a position similar to the one taken in
1989 by the French Conseil d'Etat might also be deemed reasonable.
Nevertheless, what I know about the Dutch, British and Swedish
solutions to the problem leaves me with some doubts about their liberal
democratic credentials.
dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the
means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of
public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because
it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or
even right. ... The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign.").
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